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Executive orders are not always effective, and presidential
attempts to gain control of agencies has the potential to
backfire
This week has brought the news that House Speaker John A. Boehner is planning a lawsuit
against President Obama over his use of executive orders after months of concerns from
Republicans over what they term Obama’s ‘imperial presidency’. But are the executive orders
issued by the president actually acted upon by the agencies meant to carry them out? Using
twenty years of data on executive orders, Joshua Kennedy finds that, on average, any given
executive order has only a 2.5 percent probability of being implemented. He finds that the
president can increase this probability by naming the agency involved and if the agency is
headed by an ideological friend. He also warns that if the president appoints agency staff on the
basis of their politics, rather than competence, then they may risk ending up with less competent management,
which will drag down their implementation of executive orders.
Concerns about presidential power are as old as the presidency itself, irrespective of which party may be in
control of the White House at a given time. These concerns are understandable given our broad expectations as
citizens for a government that is both representative and that does not concentrate too much power in any sector.
One often-discussed facet of presidential power is the executive order, an administrative tool that presidents can
use to direct the behavior of federal agencies. Though these directives carry the force of law, they cannot
contradict congressional statute and can easily be undone at the president’s direction. They are, therefore, more
ephemeral methods of establishing policy than standard laws, but nevertheless their impact can be particularly
significant: as one familiar example, EO 9981 issued by Harry Truman led to the desegregation of the military, a
goal the president was able to accomplish by using his authority as commander-in-chief to direct the military
departments. A noble order, to be sure, yet many worry about the ability of the president to use these directives for
purposes that may not be so noble.
The question remains, however: just how impactful are executive orders (EOs) in affecting real policy change
within the federal bureaucracy? Though the presidency may seem more oriented for action than the Congress,
given the fact that there is a single actor at the head of the institution, the truth of the matter is that the executive
branch is comprised of many individuals with their own preferences and goals. The president may nominally head
the bureaucracy, but with so many administrative layers in play it is worth asking when, how, and if these orders
are faithfully implemented. In new research I set out to demonstrate the conditions under which agencies respond
to executive orders from the president and offer some important conclusions about the true limitations of these
supposedly “unilateral” directives. I find that if the president names the agency to carry out the EO, requests that
the rule be formally promulgated, and if the agency head is ideologically aligned with the president, then the
agency will be much more likely to implement the order.
Put simply, executive orders are not self-executing by their very nature; their implementation depends on the
willingness of agency employees to put them into place. It would be unreasonable (and indeed impossible) for a
single individual, the president, to make certain that his or her directives are being effectively enacted at the
departmental level. What agency-specific factors, then, increase or decrease the likelihood of an order being
carried out?
I compiled unique data to answer this question, counting as a response the publication of a final rule or regulation
by an agency in the Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations that directly acknowledges the executive
order as part of the regulation’s authority. The data covers 1989-2011, and the baseline probability that any single
order will be implemented is slightly under two and a half percent. At first blush this seems like a remarkable rate
of non-responsiveness, but it is critical to note that orders can be wildly disparate in their content, and not every
directive requires a response. For example, many EOs deal with the creation of temporary advisory committees,
and there is no need for a regulation to accomplish this.
Not surprisingly, the two best predictors of agency response are whether the president names affected agencies
directly and whether formal rule promulgation is requested within the order. Naming the agency increases the
likelihood of a response to approximately eight and a half percentage points. Requesting formal promulgation
raises the likelihood of a response to around thirty-five percentage points, and doing both simultaneously predicts
a response rate of over sixty-seven percent.
Of note here is that sixty-seven percent is still short of what presidents would want, so it is clear that even when
agencies receive seemingly forceful directives there is no guarantee of a response. What other factors affect the
chance that an agency will implement an executive order? I considered three explicitly. The first is the agency’s
level of decentralization, by which I mean how focused are the agency’s responsibilities and mission? An
organization like the Department of Defense is comprised of numerous sub-agencies with employees that have
varying degrees of specialization, but not every agency is as complex.
The second factor is the agency’s general ideological orientation. We could imagine that an organization with
serious substantive policy oppositions to the president might resist the heavy hand of an executive order. The third
factor is the agency’s level of politicization, which I define as the percentage of employees who are political
appointees rather than career officials.
As it happens, neither the agency’s decentralization nor ideological opposition to (or symmetry with) the president
has a significant effect on the likelihood of a response to an executive order. We might expect that decentralized
agencies, because of their complexity, are less likely to implement directives as they may get “lost in the shuffle.”
This, however, is not the case. It is perhaps more surprising that ideological congruence between the president
and the agency has no noticeable effect on the likelihood that a directive will be implemented. In other words, for
example, conservative agencies seem just as responsive to liberal presidents as they are to conservative
presidents.
A separate model I tested, however, also incorporated the ideological orientation of the agency head, rather than
just the agency more generally speaking. In this case, an agency head more opposed to the president’s
ideological position predicts lower rates of response to an executive order. This suggests that it is the
organization’s upper management, and perhaps not its more career-oriented bureaucrats, that can drive the effect
of ideology on implementation.
Figure 1 – Effect of Ideological Distance Between Agency Head and President on Responsiveness
Politicization also has a noticeable effect. Though presidents may seek greater responsiveness by appointing
more loyal bureaucrats to positions of influence in the bureaucracy, politicization actually leads to lower levels of
responsiveness. What explains this finding? Research by David Lewis provides a possible answer, as he argues
that there can be an important trade-off between responsiveness and competence when it comes to matters of
politicization. This is to say the presidents seeking greater influence in agencies via the appointments process
may subsequently wind up with a less efficient organization.
Figure 2 – Effect of Agency Politicization on Responsiveness
It is possible that this loss of efficiency is to blame for lower rates of responsiveness to executive orders in more
politicized agencies. Presidents may seek control through their appointees, but perhaps instead they are ending
up with less competent management. It is critical to note, however, that this explanation is purely speculative: I do
not explicitly test for an agency’s competence, and it is certainly not the case that all political appointees are
necessarily less competent than their career-oriented counterparts.
While much more work remains to be done to understand how executive orders work in practice, what is clear is
that these directives are multifaceted and the act of changing policy hardly stops once the president issues an
order. It must still be effectively carried out by bureaucrats, and two lessons are clear: first, management matters,
as an agency head who does not share the president’s ideology may lead to lower rates of responsiveness.
Second, presidents who attempt to gain greater control through the appointments process may paradoxically
hinder their chances at affecting real policy change because of a possible loss in organizational efficiency. 
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